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Abstract 
It is widely assumed that celebrities are imbued with political capital and the power to move 
opinion. To understand the sources of that capital in the specific domain of sports celebrity, 
we investigate the popularity of global soccer superstars. Specifically, we examine players’ 
success in the Ballon d’Or – the most high profile contest to select the world’s best player. 
Based on historical election results as well as an original survey of soccer fans, we find that 
certain kinds of players are significantly more likely to win the Ballon d’Or. Moreover, we 
detect an increasing concentration of votes on these kinds of players over time, suggesting 
a clear and growing hierarchy in the competition for soccer celebrity. Further analyses of 
support for the world’s two best players in 2016 (Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo) 
show that, if properly adapted, political science concepts like partisanship have conceptual 
and empirical leverage in ostensibly non-political contests. 
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Maradona good, Pelé better, George Best1 
 
By the time George Weah was sworn in as President of Liberia in January 2018, he 
was already a veteran of several national election campaigns stretching back to 2005. But 
the prelude to Weah’s ascendancy to the country’s highest office began even earlier, to a 
time when he was widely considered one of the best soccer players in the world.2 In 1995, 
a full decade before he ran for President of Liberia for the first time, Weah had been 
crowned the world’s best player in an annual election for the so-called “Ballon d’Or” 
(Golden Ball).3 A prolific striker for Italy’s dominant AC Milan, “King George” was the 
first and only African player to come out on top in the most prestigious award in the 
world’s most popular sport; he also had been selected the best player on that continent on 
three occasions (1989, 1994, and 1995) before being designated African Player of the 
Century. 
 The link between sports celebrity and political office is old, long, and occasionally 
distinguished. Even if a global soccer celebrity becoming President of an African country 
is a novelty, Weah’s involvement in Liberian politics is not as unusual as one might think. 
At least since American decathlete Bob Mathias, a two-times Gold medalist in the 1948 
and 1952 Olympics who parlayed his fame into an acting career and a seat in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, there has been a veritable assembly line of famous athletes 
holding public office, including sporting greats like Bob Bradley (basketball), Jim 
Bunning (baseball), Ben Nighthorse Campbell (judo), Kevin Johnson (basketball), Jack 
Kemp (American football), and many more.4 
The politics of sports celebrity is not exclusively an American phenomenon, nor is 
it confined to sports superstars holding public office, however (Street 2018).5 Celebrity 
activists are commonplace, advocating on behalf of political candidates and causes, 
including climate change and racial injustice. In addition, sports celebrities exercise 
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power beyond the conventional realms of electoral politics, policy-making, and advocacy, 
by acting as symbols and influencers in the marketplace. They are sewn into the fabric of 
consumer and corporate culture – the collaboration of American football star Colin 
Kaepernick’s with sports apparel manufacturer Nike’s “Just Do It” campaign is but the 
latest, highly visible example of the potent link between production and consumption that 
undergirds the capitalist economy (Marshall 2014; Smart 2005). 
While politics and sports celebrity frequently go hand in hand, we know little about 
why some athletes are more likely to be celebrated by experts, peers, and the public. To 
begin, they are elite sportsmen and -women who gain “well knownness” (Boorstin 1972) 
through their sporting performances. However, even at the elite level of sport – and 
especially in team sports like soccer – there usually are several athletes who can claim to 
be “the best” and whose well knownness goes beyond their sporting achievements. As a 
result, contests to formally select the “best” have become valuable markers of distinction 
and sources of political and economic capital among global sporting celebrities. 
Below we investigate the oldest such contest – the Ballon d’Or – the most 
prestigious award bestowed on a player in the world’s most popular sport. Celebrity 
elections have a long history, and they have become ever more ubiquitous as technology 
has radically reduced the costs of aggregating people’s preferences.6 Soccer is no 
exception; the growth of soccer celebrity has gone hand in hand with growth in the global 
soccer economy as well as changes in the media landscape. In an age when a reality TV 
star can be elected President of the United States, understanding what drives people’s 
affinity for one icon over another matters. 
Even though leisure pursuits occupy a more important place in people’s lives than 
politics, political scientists have paid little attention to sport or celebrity (exceptions 
include the Eurovision song contest and Olympic figure skating; see e.g., Ginsburgh and 
Noury 2008; Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009; Sala, Scott, and Spriggs 2007). This is 
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surprising, in part because political scientists have a theoretical and methodological 
arsenal they can bring to bear to help make sense of people’s choices in elections, 
regardless of context. Below, we thus venture outside the conventional domain of 
electoral politics to examine voting behavior in the Ballon d’Or to identify the technical 
skills that experts reward among soccer stars, which may, in turn, translate into mass 
popularity. We also examine whether the characteristics of players receiving recognition 
have changed over time and what kinds of individual-level attitudes shape the popularity 
of players among fans today. 
Our investigation of historical Ballon d’Or results since 1956 reveals that there is a 
bias in favor of attacking players. Moreover, we detect a notable trend toward a 
decreasing number of competitive candidates from an increasingly exclusive set of 
leagues and clubs for the honor of being named the best player in the world. Thus, we 
document a convergence and concentration at the very top of soccer stardom. Our follow-
up analysis of fans’ choices in 2016 suggests that a political science concept like 
partisanship can help us understand soccer celebrity elections. The data support the idea 
that player popularity is driven both by partisan identity (in the form of support for a 
candidate’s club) as well as beliefs about how soccer ideally should be played. Together, 
this suggests that soccer fans define “best” in different but identifiable ways. 
 
The Power of Soccer Celebrity 
Played in every corner of the world, soccer is the biggest participant- and most 
popular spectator-sport in the world.7 The English Premier League, the UEFA Champions 
League, and the FIFA World Cup tournament are broadcasting and commercial bonanzas, 
with audiences in the billions watching and following teams and competitions. Given 
soccer’s popularity, it is not surprising that its most outstanding and most visible 
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performers have become global celebrities with the power to drive attention and 
potentially influence many millions of people. 
The political capital of soccer superstars is rooted in the logics of the celebrity 
economy. The demand for soccer celebrity is immense and growing (Smart 2005). Supply 
has inexorably increased as well, driven by changes in media technology and content 
delivery. Today’s soccer celebrities thus are hybrid creatures who combine athletic 
excellence with easy commodification. On the field, the best players ply their trade for the 
biggest clubs in the best leagues. Off the field, they are fodder for celebrity content, act as 
club and brand ambassadors, and in some cases have turned themselves into independent 
brands and commercial entities.  
 
The Consequences of Sports Celebrity 
From John Wayne to Marilyn Monroe and Wilt Chamberlain to Muhammad Ali, 
entertainment and sports celebrities have long been active in supporting political parties, 
candidates, and causes. Yet, understanding how they fit into the life of modern political 
economies is not a question traditionally asked by political scientists (West and Orman 
2003). In recent years, however, a nascent body of research has revealed that celebrities 
matter for elections and issue advocacy, and a number of scholars have begun to assess 
when and why issue advocacy or endorsements by celebrities are effective (Atkinson and 
DeWitte 2018; Brockington 2014; Cooper 2008; Nownes 2012; Street, Inthorn, and Scott 
2015; West and Orman 2003). Growing evidence suggests that celebrities help shape 
political debates and drive voters’ attention toward and support for specific candidates in 
elections (Atkinson and de Witte 2016; Marsh, Hart and Tindall 2010; Street 2012; 
Wheeler 2013). Aside from the obvious case of reality-TV star Donald Trump in 2016, 
perhaps the best-known example is Oprah’s endorsement of Barack Obama in the 2008 
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presidential primary (Garthwaite and Moore 2013; Nownes 2012; Pease and Brewer 
2008). 
The power of celebrity endorsements is not lost on politicians; in countries the 
world over where soccer is by far the most popular sport, soccer stars and teams have 
long been politicians’ celebrities of choice. Thus, Silvio Berlusconi famously named his 
political party “Forza Italia” after the chant of Italian soccer fans rooting for the national 
team, and it was no coincidence that Berlusconi owned AC Milan, the club George Weah 
played for at the time.8 Numerous other politicians have tried to piggyback on the 
popularity of soccer to boost their own popularity, and for good reason: sporting events 
produce a positive halo effect.9 
Beyond the positive impact of sports celebrities on politicians’ fortunes, the 
economic and cultural power of sport is considerable. This is especially true of soccer. 
Billions on every continent follow their favorite teams and players week in and week out, 
and the global soccer market continues to grow (Deloitte 2017).10 Soccer celebrities and 
brands are not just commercial projects, however. Investments into teams and leagues by 
sovereign wealth funds from the Middle East (Qatar, UAE) as well as state-supported 
financing entities and businesses (e.g., China) have introduced a significant dose of 
geopolitics and soft power dynamics into the sport. 
As a result, soccer’s global celebrities are imbued with political capital and have 
the power to move opinion. Players have become ambassadors for clubs, sponsors, 
owners, and even nation-states, and they routinely monetize the hundreds of millions of 
social media followers they have. In recent years, individual celebrity players even have 
become global brands in their own right, with greatly enhanced power to drive attention. 
Perhaps no player personifies this trend more than Cristiano Ronaldo, the Portuguese 
superstar who exceeded 330 million social media followers in 2018, making him the most 
followed person in the world and helping him earn tens of millions of dollars in 
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endorsements from sponsors (KPMG 2018). And for good reason: celebrity endorsements 
draw attention and increase sales (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995; Farrell et al. 2000). In 
fact, business consultants KPMG concluded in a report titled “Ronaldo Economics” that 
the player’s move from Real Madrid to Juventus Turin in July 2018 was as much a 
merger as a player transfer. The economic rationale behind the move from Madrid to 
Turin was simple: Ronaldo “can be an accelerator of the visible growth that Juventus FC 
have already experienced....” In other words, Ronaldo the brand will sustain and grow the 
business that is Juventus Turin the soccer club.11 
Ronaldo is but the most visible and recent exemplar of the market power soccer 
celebrities can harness, and his success serves as an important data point in the historical 
evolution of sports celebrity. As manufacturing industries declined and service industries 
grew during the course of the 20th century, celebrity shifted away from business and 
professions to entertainment and sport (Smart 2005, 11). Simply put, celebrities went 
from representing “idols of production” to representing “idols of consumption.” Yet, the 
exact nature of the power that sports celebrities can wield and where it originates are less 
clear. Celebrities exercise power “over” (Weber) as well as “with” others (Arendt), and 
that power can be exercised in visible, hidden, and invisible ways (Partzsch 2015). Given 
that much of the literature on politics and celebrity is framed in terms of leadership and 
how celebrity leaders affect politics (Street 2018), why select celebrity actors command 
high-levels of attention in the public realm and therefore hold prospects for influence 
remains largely an open question. 
 
Sources of Celebrity Capital 
To understand the nature and power of global soccer celebrity, we build on 
celebrity theory. Speaking generally, this multi-disciplinary scholarship is united by a 
focus on the “nexus between fame and consumption” (Morgan 2011, 104) and an 
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emphasis on the mass production of images and narratives about unusual and therefore 
noteworthy public individuals. Athletes have long figured in these narratives (Turner 
2004).12 They are public figures who transcend their original achievements to become 
celebrities – that is, they come to the public’s attention because of their superior qualities 
that then arouse interest beyond the field of play.  
Their celebrity status is powerful exactly because they embody positive values of 
achievement that are easily commodified (Smart 2005). Moreover, because they personify 
the illusion that even ordinary individuals have a chance to realize their special qualities 
and become celebrities (Giulianotti 1999, 118-19), they provide legitimacy to the 
ideological foundation of liberalism and capitalism through their achievement-focused 
authenticity (Marshall 2015). In the 21st century, the successful commodification of sports 
celebrities results from the increasingly powerful and highly symbiotic relationships 
among athletes, brands, and mass media that turn an athletic superstar into a celebrity 
while, at the same time, enhancing brands by lending them legitimacy. In parallel, mass 
media and soccer clubs also have become mutually dependent for exposure and content as 
clubs have gone from producing matches and players to producing soccer content 
consumed across various media platforms (Marshall 2014). 
The importance of image rights in the compensation of players serves as a marker 
of this shift: while players used to be paid for playing soccer, today they are also paid for 
the rights to reproduce their images. A long-term process of celebritization has shaped 
and changed who becomes a global soccer celebrity in the first place – namely, those who 
can most easily be personalized and commodified via global mass media (see also 
Driessens 2013; Fiske 1987). At the same time, changes in the media landscape also have 
made political capital a more viable currency: the boundaries between “entertainment” 
and “news” have become blurred (Prior 2005), opening pathways for celebrities to enter 
and shape politics, and for political actors of all stripes to use and be used by 
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entertainment media (Lawrence and Boydstun, forthcoming). The convenient conflation 
of news and entertainment is driven by supply as well as demand, as citizens happily self-
select into different news environments, with a significant portion preferring 
entertainment to news (Prior 2005, 2007). 
 While soccer superstars accumulate political capital from their celebrity status, only 
a tiny number of them look to acquire political power via so-called migration – the move 
from the playing field to political office. Instead, the vast majority possess informal 
power because of their ability to mobilize a wide range and great number of people on a 
global scale (Partzsch 2018). Informal celebrity political capital is not as stable as other 
power resources, however. In fact, because few athletes cross the threshold to being well 
known for their well knownness where celebrity becomes disconnected from sporting 
achievement, for most soccer stars, celebrity status is temporary: celebrity culture 
demands innovation, turnover, and the thrill of the new (Horne et al. 1999), and celebrity 
status therefore needs to be continuously reconfirmed. 
For soccer’s biggest stars, the traditional way of ensuring the continuous 
confirmation of well knownness has been via on-field success like winning the World 
Cup or other championships. However, because trophies are shared with teammates and 
coaches, individual awards like the Ballon d’Or – the prize for being singled out as the 
best player on the planet – help validate and build a player’s individual claim to greatness. 
In fact, contests like the Ballon d’Or have become increasingly important for bestowing 
superstar status on participants as the global soccer and celebrity industries have evolved. 
Audiences rely on status signals to infer the value of players and these “status shifts can 
translate into changes in how audiences perceive actors, resulting in benefits for unearned 
status gains and costs for unearned status losses” (Bowers and Prato 2017).  
Taken together, then, soccer celebrity is two-faced: on one hand, it bestows 
political, social, and economic power on those who possess it; at the same time, it is in 
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constant need of affirmation. As a result, celebrity awards are one important mechanism 
for validating and reaffirming celebrity status, and there has been a notable increase in 
attention paid to them. Doing well in the Ballon d’Or election is therefore an invaluable 
stamp of approval that authenticates and personalizes achievement and confers power and 
status to those who place near the top. This also means that understanding the sources of 
celebrity popularity – the characteristics that propel experts and fans to classify some 
players as more deserving of recognition than others – is important. The question thus 
becomes: what kind of election is the Ballon d’Or, who wins it, and why? 
 
The Politics of the Ballon d’Or 
The Ballon d’Or (Golden Ball) is an annual election to select the best soccer player 
in the world. Held since 1956, the competition’s rules have changed several times, most 
importantly with regard to candidate eligibility rules and who gets to vote in the 
election.13 Between 1956 and 2006, the electorate was composed of a jury of soccer 
journalists accredited to the national soccer federations within UEFA, the European 
soccer governing body. After 2007, the pool of eligible voters was expanded to include a 
jury of specialist journalists as well as the coaches and captains of national teams from 
each of the national soccer associations around the world. Finally, there have been 
different mechanisms of candidate nomination and voting over the years, with the 
editorial board of France Football acting as a nomination board for the final list of 
candidates (typically ranging from 23 to 30). Voters were asked to cast ballots for five of 
the candidates on the list, indicating their preferences in the form of a ranking by 
allocating 5 points to their first ranked candidate, 4 points for the second-ranked 
candidate, and so on. The candidate with the most points would be elected the winner. 
Since 2010, electors have been able to cast only three ballots by ranking their top three 
candidates who, in turn, received 5, 3, and 1 votes, respectively.14 
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 Over time, the politics of the Ballon d’Or have revolved around what it means for a 
player to be the best, as well as why the electorate makes the choices it does. For clarity, 
France Football has defined “best” by providing several criteria to be considered by 
voters, including on-field performance as well as a player’s behavior on and off the field. 
Among others, voters were instructed to consider a player’s individual and team 
performances during the previous twelve months, including championships won; his skill 
and fair play on the field; and his career accomplishments. Interestingly, the definition of 
“best” also includes a player’s appeal – his personality and charisma (or what the French 
call “rayonnement” and the Germans refer to as “Ausstrahlung”). 
 In the end, deservingness and thus popularity lie squarely in the eye of the 
individual voter; fans and candidates alike often raise questions about why one player 
won over another, or why some fail to be nominated in the first place. Even those coming 
close to winning occasionally cry foul. Cristiano Ronaldo, for example, when 
commenting on the outcome of the 2012 election where he finished second behind Lionel 
Messi, commented that 
“It’s not a question of life and death – it’s not the end of the world. But I still 
haven’t understood the criteria. One year it’s about performance, the next it’s 
about silverware.”15 
 
While Ronaldo may have been a sore loser, he understands – perhaps better than anyone – 
that Ballon d’Or elections matter as a highly visible mechanism to assign celebrity status, 
under the auspices of a media company no less. 
Of course, who should a priori be expected to win and how voters evaluate 
candidates in elections has long been of interest to political scientists. Long-standing 
research programs have examined the backgrounds of candidates for public office, for 
instance, and how they affect voters’ assessments of their quality as representatives (e.g., 
Dolan 2014; Lawless and Fox 2004; Kittilson 2006; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Carnes and Lupu 
2016; Hutchings and Valentino 2004). At the core of this research are two questions: first, 
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on the supply side, which candidates choose to run, have the necessary qualifications, and 
thus deserve to serve; second, on the demand side, are there recognizable physical and 
demographic characteristics of candidates that matter for the choices voters make? 
 
Ballon d’Or Elections: Historical Patterns 
While political science research would suggest that successful Ballon d’Or 
candidates should differ on specific dimensions important to voters, exactly what those 
dimensions are is unclear. Perhaps the most obvious of these are soccer-specific 
characteristics like club, league, or playing position that may help players become 
recognized as high achievers on the field of play in the first place. To investigate the 
characteristics that are associated with success in the Ballon d’Or, we assembled data on 
all elections since 1956. Specifically, we collected the three highest-ranked players’ 
names, their nationalities, the clubs they played for, and the leagues their clubs competed 
in. In addition, we gathered soccer-specific data about the player’s position on the field.16 
Out of the billions of boys who have kicked the ball since 1956, the members of this elite 
group have been considered the very best. 
 
Leagues and Clubs 
 The data show that Ballon d’Or results are far from random. Considering the 
provenance of players in terms of their nationality, league, and team, several patterns 
stand out. First, the leagues player compete in and the teams they play for are not created 
equal when it comes to supplying Ballon d’Or winners. Even though there are roughly 30 
professional leagues on the European continent, the biggest leagues in Europe – the top 
divisions in England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain – are far more likely to be 
represented among top vote getters. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, there is a clear hierarchy 
that has become ever more concentrated over time: Ballon d’Or winners and top 3 
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finishers are more likely to play in top five leagues than any other. Moreover, the data 
reveal a trend away from a broader array of leagues in the earlier decades toward the four 
biggest leagues (England, Germany, Italy, and Spain), with Spain’s La Liga supplying 
more winners and top finishers than the other big leagues combined.17 
This tendency of soccer celebrities to come from certain leagues is also reflected in 
the clubs where winners and top vote getters ply their trade (Figure 2), with the big 
Spanish clubs – Barcelona and Real Madrid – providing most of the winners since 1995. 
While the dominance of the Spanish league and Madrid and Barcelona has been 
buttressed by two of the best players in the history of the game (Messi and Ronaldo) 
playing there, these clubs have always been among the most likely to have the best 
players, even going back to the 1950s, with great players like Alfredo Di Stefano and 
Ferenç Puskas representing Real Madrid in the 1950s, for instance. 
In turn, over time the smaller clubs in smaller leagues have started to lose out. This 
is especially evident when considering top finishers before 1995: while a stable of big 
clubs (e.g., Juventus Turin, AC Milan, Inter Milan, Bayern Munich), has consistently 
provided Ballon d’Or contenders, historically a number also played for smaller clubs in 
lesser leagues. Thus, not only is playing for one of the biggest clubs in Spain a better 
guarantee for having a chance at winning the Ballon d’Or than anything else, this 
tendency has only become more pronounced over time. 
 
(Figures 1 and 2 about here) 
 
Nationality and Playing Position  
Soccer is a global industry that has long seen significant labor migration across 
countries and continents, with the best players seeking out the most lucrative 
opportunities.18 Looking at the national backgrounds of the Ballon d’Or contenders, two 
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patterns stand out (Figure 3): first, the big soccer nations of the world produce 
disproportionately more Ballon d’Or winners and vote getters, and this has been the case 
for a long time. Second, while there is more heterogeneity in national origin than other 
characteristics, the biggest “exporters” of elite soccer players – Argentina and Brazil – are 
also more likely to provide contenders for the Ballon d’Or since non-Europeans became 
eligible in 1995. 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
When it comes to success on the field of play, soccer is a team game, with specific 
tactical formations, roles, and positions for individual players. Positions are categorized 
by whether a player’s job is to score goals or prevent them. Goalkeepers and defenders 
are tasked primarily with preventing the opposition from scoring, while strikers are 
attacking players whose job it is to score goals. Midfielders occupy a role between 
defense and attack. 
 Looking at the positions of players who have won the Ballon d’Or or received most 
of the ballots reveals a striking pattern: the odds of doing well in the Ballon d’Or increase 
as players’ positions move them further up the field. Both before and since 1995, many 
more strikers did well in the Ballon d’Or than any of the other positions (Figure 4). 
Strikers have won more Ballons d’Or than any of the other positions combined and, as 
with the concentration of players in particular leagues, this pattern has become more 
pronounced over time: since 1995, strikers have been more than three times more likely 
(17 v. 5) to win than midfielders (one single defender won during this time). In contrast, 
only a single goalkeeper – the legendary Lev Yashin of Russia (USSR) – ever won the 
award over the entire history of the Ballon d’Or (in 1963). 
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(Figure 4 about here) 
Taken together, then, our historical analysis of the popularity of soccer superstars 
suggests several patterns. Over the last six decades, the Ballon d’Or has been bestowed on 
a great variety of individuals, but with a clear and, over time, ever more pronounced 
preference for the biggest leagues and the biggest clubs, especially in Spain and Italy, and 
perhaps most importantly, for players who score goals rather than prevent them. On its 
face, the increasing concentration of votes on certain positions, leagues, and clubs might 
indicate that the market for players has become more efficient. But regardless of the 
underlying cause, the notable bias in favor of attacking players like Messi, Ronaldo, or 
Weah suggests that glory is apportioned by voters in a very particular way: experts as 
well as fans like to see goals and idolize those who score them. 
In part, this reflects the evolution of soccer. Viewed over many decades, tactics 
have become more defensive, goals have become rarer and more precious, and attacking 
players have become the most expensive players (Anderson and Sally 2013; Wilson 
2013). Aside from this on-field logic, the increasing tendency of Ballon d’Or voters to 
elevate attacking players may also lie in the media’s role in narrating “the events of sport, 
transforming them into stories with stars and characters; heroes and villains” (Whannel 
1998, 23). In particular, a key contributor to the construction of these characters has been 
the way soccer matches are staged and produced, with TV broadcasts strongly 
emphasizing certain elements in viewers’ minds. Nowhere is this more obvious than in 
the glorification of attacking players and goal scorers via specific camera angles and 
moments of the game (Buscombe 1975; Whannel 1992): “Much of the routine coverage 
of a live soccer match simply follows the action through [camera] C1 and C2 (…) It is 
only when goals are scored that television’s visual coverage moves into a different gear. 
It no longer follows the action. It produces its own visual narrative” (Scannell 2014:162). 
Goals thus have a significant impact on who wins the Ballon d’Or and becomes a soccer 
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celebrity because the dominant production aesthetic of the new television culture turns the 
most precious moments of the game into focal events (Fiske 1987). In these moments, 
star players are isolated, shown in close-ups, and dramatized.19 
 
Messi Versus Ronaldo: Understanding Fans’ Choices of Soccer Celebrities 
In recent years, two players – Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo – have been able 
to consistently lay claim to being the best in the world, scoring the most goals in the best 
leagues, sharing most of the best player awards, and achieving unparalleled global 
recognition. The 2016 Ballon d’Or election followed a familiar script, turning yet again 
into a two-horse race. In the end, it was Ronaldo’s year; he won the award for the 4th time 
as his club, Real Madrid, triumphed in the UEFA Champions League and his country, 
Portugal, won the European Championship.20 
The 2016 contest raises several questions, however. Messi and Ronaldo are both 
strikers who played for two of the biggest clubs in the world in the same league (Spain). 
In this way, they fit the prototypical Ballon d’Or winner documented above to a T. 
However, given their similarities, how do fans arrive at their choice of one over the other? 
To better understand the motivations of individual voters in celebrity election contests, 
we sought to take advantage of fans’ familiarity with the Ballon d’Or competition by 
conducting our own election survey and allowing any fan anywhere in the world to cast a 
vote for their favorite player (see appendix).21 
 
Soccer Partisanship and Values: Hypotheses 
Given that their background categories did not strongly differentiate Ronaldo and 
Messi, we focused on two factors derived from political science scholarship that could 
motivate support for soccer celebrities: partisanship – affinity for a particular team – and 
values – beliefs people have about how soccer should be played.  
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Most soccer fans support or feel close to a particular team. To understand this 
attachment, we draw on scholarship on party identification, perhaps the most important 
variable for understanding how people vote. The original conceptualization put forward 
by the authors of The American Voter defined party identification as an “individual’s 
affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment” (Campbell et al. 
1960, 121). This conceptualization views partisanship as deeply rooted in a person’s 
social identity and an enduring part of an individual’s self-conception (Greene 1999).22 
This kind of “expressive partisanship” is similar to people’s attachment to soccer clubs 
and akin to “teammanship” (see also Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002); like club 
supportership, it is grounded in social identities where in- and out-group considerations 
are important (Huddy, Mason and Aarøe 2015): 
“The social identity model of partisan politics is not very different from that 
advanced to explain the ardor and actions of sports fans. Weakly identified fans 
may attend games when the team is doing well and skip those where defeat is 
likely, but strong fans persevere and participate, even when the team is sure to 
lose, in order to boost their team’s chances of victory” (Huddy, Mason and Aarøe 
2015, 3) 
Upon closer inspection, expressive partisanship parallels club partisanship in 
important ways. The longevity and loyalty of support for a particular team is a striking 
fact; several ethnographic studies have investigated the origins of this support and the 
processes by which individuals become socialized into being supporters. This research 
indicates that the socialization process starts at an early age and melds individual and club 
identities. Moreover, there is a powerful influence of family, usually fathers, early in life. 
Thus, as with political partisanship, kinship acts as a transmission belt of support for the 
club through the generations (Crawford 2004; Dixon 2013; see also Duke 2002; for an 
economic view on fandom, see Kuper and Szymanski 2018).23 
Nick Hornby’s autobiographic novel Fever Pitch is perhaps the most famous 
statement of becoming a soccer fan, and how fandom evolves over time. Hornby, a 
supporter of Arsenal FC in London, powerfully evokes the fusion of club support and 
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social identity and the power of socialization to produce support in the first place: “I was 
chained to Arsenal and my dad was chained to me, and there was no way out for any of 
us” (Hornby 1992). Hornby’s compelling account suggests that, in many ways, support 
for a soccer team is not perceived as a choice. 
Moreover, to this day local or regional identities commonly overlap with soccer 
partisanship, with clubs often serving as vehicles for fans to express a partisan or 
geographic identity (Kuper 1994). To be sure, as a result of the commodification of 
soccer, the contemporary sources of support are no longer exclusively tied to geography 
(Taylor 1971; Critcher 1979; Duke 2002), and it has become more common for fans from 
around the globe to identify with a team even if they never set foot inside its stadium 
(Giulianotti 2002).24 Yet, even though children in particular gravitate toward certain clubs 
because they have celebrity players, a player’s presence does not sustain support for a 
club. While a superstar player can be the initial trigger, people will stick with the club 
when the player moves on, irrespective of its fortunes (Giulianotti 2005). For most 
people, this means that becoming a supporter is something that is learned early in life, 
“hereditary”, and sticky; in many ways, it is akin to partisanship. 
Our own survey supports this conjecture. When asked why they supported the club 
they did, 65% of respondents who expressed support for a team indicated that it was the 
team they supported since they were young. Moreover, by a 2 to 1 margin, they reported 
that their parents or grandparents supported the same team.25 Thus, for individuals who 
self-identify as followers of a club, affiliation can be expected to be a strong motivation to 
support a candidate from that club.26 
But if soccer partisans are like Huddy et al.’s expressive, social identity partisans, 
they do not simply root for their team; expressive partisanship also implies rooting 
against other teams (see Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). In this way, too, affinity for a 
club is similar to partisanship as social identity. Put another way, if selecting someone as 
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the “best” player is as simple as picking the best striker in one’s favorite club, then the 
choice between Ronaldo and Messi should be driven by attachment to the clubs they play 
for. However, if being a club supporter is like being an expressive partisan, it should also 
make it significantly less likely that partisans will vote for the superstar of a rival team. 
Beyond partisanship, we sought to examine the impact that values may have on 
voter preferences. Since soccer’s beginnings, players, coaches, and fans have debated the 
importance of winning versus playing the game a particular way. Although everyone likes 
winning while also doing so in the right way – however defined – there may be times 
when the two come into conflict. When they do, some believe it is more important to win, 
no matter how, while others believe it is more important to play a particular way, even at 
the risk of losing the game (Anderson and Sally 2013; Goldblatt 2008). Sometimes 
referred to as “right-wing” (practical, win at all cost) and “left-wing” (idealist, play 
beautifully) philosophies (Wilson 2013), there is no other sport in the world where this 
essential tradeoff is as hotly debated as it is in soccer and where the beliefs that underlie 
the tradeoff between playing style and winning are as deeply embedded or as connected 
to social identity. As the Uruguayan author Eduardo Galeano famously pointed out in his 
seminal treatise Soccer in Sun and Shadow, “I play therefore I am.” 
We sought to define and measure soccer values and examine their effects on voters’ 
preferences for one player over another. While both Ronaldo and Messi are extremely 
competitive athletes with extraordinary desire to win, Ronaldo’s image has been that of 
the alpha male blessed with superior athleticism; in contrast, the diminutive Messi’s 
image is that someone who wins on style, clever play, and being part of the team’s 
collective tactics and movements. A priori, the impact that values may have on voter 
choices can be conceptualized in two ways: First, it would be reasonable to expect Messi 
and Ronaldo voters to like winning trophies as well as playing in a particular way. After 
all, both have won multiple trophies, and both have a recognizable style of play. In this 
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case, the importance of winning and style should have similar and independent effects on 
votes for Ronaldo and Messi. 
Alternatively, if people believe that there is a tradeoff between winning and style, 
soccer values may be thought of as a continuum where placing a priority on winning 
defines one pole and putting a priority on style the other. While some voters might value 
winning at all cost and others style above else, those somewhere in the middle might 
value both.27 One of the potential implications of the carefully crafted soccer personalities 
of Ronaldo and Messi may be that they have come to reflect the trade-off between 
winning and style in fans’ minds: if Ronaldo and Messi represent opposing soccer 
“ideologies,” respectively, then voters motivated by the importance of winning should be 
more likely to vote for Ronaldo, while Messi voters should be motivated to a greater 
degree by a player’s style. 
 
Measures 
Dependent Variables 
We estimated the impact of club affiliation and soccer values fans’ preferences as 
expressed by the Ballon d’Or voting system. In this scenario, voters were asked to rank-
order their top three candidates for the award, assigning 5, 3, and 1 points, respectively. 
The contest was tight: while Messi received a higher percentage of first place votes on the 
ranked choices (24.1% versus 23.1%), Ronaldo achieved an average of 1.78 points to 
Messi’s 1.73 points as a result of receiving a greater proportion of second place votes. 
 
Independent Variables 
Based on a question asking respondents which club they support, we constructed 
dummy variables for Real Madrid fans (Ronaldo’s club) and Barcelona fans (Messi’s 
club) (see appendix). 10.5% of respondents indicated that they were supporters of either 
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club. In addition, we measured soccer values by asking respondents why they watch 
soccer – whether they prefer to see a well-played game or whether they prefer to see their 
team win. We also gauged people’s reasons for the choices they made: a player’s superior 
level of skill and talent, because he helped his team win games and trophies, or because 
the respondent preferred the player’s style of play. Finally, we also included a set of 
standard demographic variables, including gender, age, living in a city, religiosity, 
education, and marital status. 
 
Results 
The results of our multivariate regressions reveal several patterns consistent with 
our conjectures (Figure 5 and appendix). First, Real Madrid fans are significantly more 
likely to vote for Ronaldo, while Barcelona fans were significantly more likely to vote for 
Messi. Moreover, consistent with the idea that soccer partisanship is a social identity, the 
reverse holds as well, with Real Madrid fans ranking Messi significantly less highly and 
Barcelona fans ranking Ronaldo less highly. Interestingly, despite the presence of 
multiple Barcelona and Madrid players in the candidate pool, the effect sizes are virtually 
identical. Being a Barca or Real Madrid fan increased each candidate’s overall point tally 
by almost 1.5 points, and reduced it by roughly half that amount among fans of the rival 
team. Thus, there is a sizable positive effect for soccer partisanship, and the effect is 
about twice the size as the negative effect of not voting for another team’s candidate. 
To fully appreciate the strength of the relationship, it is important to recall that the 
Ballon d’Or is a heavily “candidate-centered” election that is neither overtly political, 
nor were voters presented with club (partisan) identifying information (the club they 
play for) next to the candidates’ names. Moreover, Ronaldo and Messi were not the 
only candidates from their respective clubs who made the 30-player shortlist. While 
Barcelona had four finalists (Messi, Luis Suarez, Neymar, and Andrés Iniesta), Real 
 21 
Madrid had a total of six (Ronaldo, Gareth Bale, Pepe, Toni Kroos, Luka Modric, and 
Sergio Ramos). Thus, support for the club could not be expected to be synonymous with 
support for Messi or Ronaldo and both sets of supporters had several candidates to choose 
from, thus potentially diluting the effect. 
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 
Taken together, our results indicate that Messi’s and Ronaldo’s ability to attract 
votes is to a significant extent derived from the clubs they play for. Conversely, our 
results cast doubt on the notion that either or any player, regardless of skill, would be able 
to win the Ballon d’Or if they played for a club in a much weaker league. While the 
relationship between star athlete and his platform (the club) is undoubtedly symbiotic, the 
club brand is much older and affinities to clubs much deeper than the bonds that tie fans 
to individual players. 
The variables measuring people’s motivations to watch soccer – to see a well-
played game or see their team win – had no measurable effect on support for Ronaldo or 
Messi. Aside from support for a player’s club, the most notable differentiator between 
Messi and Ronaldo can be found in the variables tapping into people’s reasons for their 
vote: those who say that the player’s skill and talent were important also were 
significantly more likely to vote for Messi, while this variable had no effect on votes for 
Ronaldo. 
With regard to the tradeoff between winning and style, the results are consistent 
with expectations, with an important caveat. While winning games and trophies mattered 
greatly for Ronaldo voters, the opposite was true for Messi supporters, though to a much 
lesser degree. In parallel, respondents who indicated that they liked a player’s style were 
significantly less likely to rank Ronaldo highly but no more likely to vote for Messi. 
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Thus, the evidence that soccer values indeed constitute a continuum that ranges from 
valuing style on one end to prizing winning over anything else on the other is mixed: 
while winning goes with Ronaldo and style against him, soccer values also distinguish 
Ronaldo voters much more clearly than Messi voters. 
We report on several robustness tests in the online appendix. Taken together, our 
results suggest that Messi’s and Ronaldo’s popularity are deeply intertwined with fans’ 
affinities for their respective clubs and the antipathies they have toward other clubs. 
Beyond this shared and consistent partisan effect, Ronaldo’s support is strongly and 
positively driven by respondents’ attitudes about a player’s association with being a 
winner, while those who valued style were significantly less likely to prefer Ronaldo’s 
candidacy. In contrast, style did not strongly affect Messi’s support, while those who 
prized winning were slightly less to cast their ballots for him. Instead, votes for Messi 
were votes for skill as a key criterion. In this way, the results suggest that considerations 
of winning and style were more about Ronaldo than Messi, and that the two do not 
cleanly constitute two sides of the soccer values coin. At a minimum, the results show 
that consideration of who is “best” triggers consideration of soccer values beyond the 
importance of scoring goals. 
 
Conclusion 
Two years before Adolf Hitler’s infamous staging of the 1936 Olympic Games in 
Berlin, Benito Mussolini was busy fixing the 1934 soccer World Cup in Italy, primarily 
by bribing the referees and thereby ensuring Italy won the tournament. Today’s soccer 
politics is less nefarious and more glamorous; instead of serving as an overt tool of 
propaganda and political power, it has become an instrument of global commercial and 
soft power – soccer has become big business, and the best players are global celebrities 
with the power to influence many millions of people. 
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To understand who becomes a soccer celebrity and thus has the potential to 
influence millions of people, we investigated one of the sources of celebrity popularity – 
the oldest and most prestigious award for the best player in the world, the so-called 
Ballon d’Or. Specifically, we sought to pinpoint the characteristics that propel experts to 
classify some players as more deserving of recognition than others, and we identified the 
individual-level attitudes that influence the popularity of particular players among fans. 
Our analysis shows that “best” is defined in a particular way. Not only are the players 
who score goals considered better than the rest, but there also is a clear trend in favor of 
players who play for an ever more exclusive set of leagues and clubs. Moreover, player 
popularity is shaped both by partisan identity (in the form of support for a candidate’s 
club) and ideas about the best way to play the game.  
 We believe our analysis contributes to the study of politics as well as celebrity. 
Expanding the study of elections beyond the conventional realm of democratic politics 
allows researchers to broaden the definition of politics as well as examine the boundaries 
of political science concepts and methodological approaches. In an era when people are 
increasingly asked to express their views about a variety of subjects – which products 
they prefer, which participants should remain on or leave TV reality shows, and which is 
the best song – the application political science ideas and insights may be productive, for 
two reasons: first, such contests offer political scientists the opportunity to examine 
theories of voter behavior in new settings; second, given the rise of celebrity politics 
around the world, existing political science concepts can contribute to the growing body 
of knowledge about the nexus of politics and superstardom in a specific domain. 
 The study of partisanship – a staple in electoral research – serves as an example of 
the potential utility of political science concepts in a “non-political” context. We argue 
and show that partisanship as team supportership helps us understand how attachments to 
soccer clubs translate to support for soccer celebrities. Thus, expressive partisanship can 
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be adapted to and has significant leverage in a non-political setting. Moreover, this kind 
of partisanship connects to broader discussions of political knowledge and citizen 
competence (e.g., Lupia 2016). Even the earliest voting studies recognized that 
attachment to a party reduced the need for information: “For many people, votes are not 
perceived as decisions to be made in each specific election. For them voting traditions are 
not changed much more often than careers are chosen, religions drifted into or away from, 
or tastes revised” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 17). 
The fans in our survey sample are even more knowledgeable and committed than 
voters in regular elections who also tend to be more informed and committed than non-
voting citizens. And yet, even among these soccer “sophisticates” and “fanatics,” 
partisanship and values matter greatly for explaining which superstar receives their 
support. This suggests that it is not enough to simply be a superior athlete to win celebrity 
contests like the Ballon d’Or, but that one has to be affiliated with the right club and have 
a discernible profile. In turn, this suggests that the political influence of soccer celebrities 
may well be heavily constrained by the team they play for rather than just their well 
knownness, given that the political messages of soccer stars are likely to be interpreted 
through the prism of the club they play or played for (see also Zaller 1992).28 
In addition to our desire to push the boundaries of established political science 
concepts like partisanship, we sought to contribute to the study of celebrity by heeding 
Turner’s (2010, 19) call to focus on the production of celebrity power and to expand the 
range of methodologies employed in the study of celebrity. By examining sports celebrity 
elections through the lens of political science and with the help of commonplace 
analytical tools we hoped to provide rigor to discussions about these contests.  
Beyond the study of politics and celebrity, our findings may also have normative 
implications. Contests like the Ballon d’Or serve a broader function in contemporary 
political economies: while students of politics usually see elections as instruments of 
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democracy, they are equally powerful devices for legitimizing the existing political order 
that underpins capitalist democracy (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 2005). This is ironic. In 
many ways, soccer is the most democratic of elite sports. Unlike basketball, it does not 
favor a particular body shape, and unlike ice hockey or American football, it requires very 
little equipment. Moreover, the contemporary celebration of soccer stardom contributes to 
the illusion that fame and fortune are not just desirable but possible and achieved 
regularly the world over. The reality is quite different and much harsher: not only is the 
selection process to become an elite player thoroughly Darwinian, the success of soccer’s 
global celebrities follows the logic of so-called ‘winner-take-all markets’ where rewards 
are apportioned asymmetrically “in the hands of a few top performers, with small 
differences in talent or effort often giving rise to enormous differences in incomes” 
(Frank and Cook 1996, 24). Inequalities in the compensation of professional soccer 
players have been growing for years and mirror similar inequalities in labor markets for 
other skills in post-industrial economies.29 
In this way, our study confirms that inequality is a pervasive feature of sports 
celebrity. The winners of the Ballon d’Or are increasingly strikers (the “individual stars”) 
from the wealthiest, most dominant clubs. Their celebrity is positioned at the intersection 
of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism, both of which prize individualism and 
“are nurtured by the supreme technology of hyper-individualization (commercial 
television).” (Marshall 2014, 1). This kind of celebrity helps cement in place existing 
orders and hierarchies while, at the same time, creating a political space and capital for 
individual elites who are unelected and unaccountable. As such, the rise of sports 
celebrities and the attention and influence they command raises complex questions of 
legitimacy in an increasingly unequal and elite-dominated political realm. 
On the positive side of the ledger, the power of global influencers, while informal, 
can be significant. Celebrities are able to exercise power in multiple ways via visible and 
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invisible means (Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos and Huliaras 2011; Partzsch 2015). This 
power can be used to hold officeholders to account for their actions, and in ways that are 
more effective than what individual citizens or marginalized groups can accomplish. In 
this way, celebrities can help to counteract growing inequalities in political representation 
by giving voice to the powerless (e.g., Gilens and Page 2014). 
At the same time, the power of celebrities raises questions of democratic 
legitimacy. After all, celebrities have louder voices and are able to be heard in ways 
average citizens cannot. Given the challenge of holding celebrities themselves 
accountable for their political action, except perhaps through market action (see also 
Partzsch 2017), a lack of democratic control could become problematic if celebrities 
convey more radical positions that are not generally endorsed by those they claim to 
represent, the international community, or democratic consensus (Partzsch 2018).  
The inequalities that abound in politics, sports, and celebrity call for further 
investigation. One issue easily overlooked in the context of soccer celebrity is gender. 
Candidates for the Ballon d’Or have been exclusively male, as are the vast majority of 
soccer fans around the world. While soccer is no exception to the gendered production 
and consumption of sports and sports celebrity, recent years have seen significant changes 
in how women interact with soccer as players and fans on a global scale (Markovits and 
Rensmann 2010). At the same time, women’s entry as producers – players, coaches, and 
celebrities – occurred in spaces that provided very different pre-conditions. In contrast to 
the U.S. where women entered a soccer space that was marginal, in Europe and elsewhere 
women’s soccer and women as soccer fans still do not belong to the core of the 
hegemonic sports culture centered around male soccer (Fechtig 1995). 
 While the gendered production of soccer is changing – albeit more slowly than 
many would like – we have no systematic evidence whether or how the global appeal of 
soccer celebrities extends to women. In our own survey, we find that female respondents 
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express slightly less interest in the sport than men (6.6 v. 8.2 on a 0-10 scale). We also 
find that women and men differ with regard to the traits that make for an admirable soccer 
player. Women were less likely to rank either of the top two candidates highly, reducing 
both Messi’s and Ronaldo’s points tally by more than half a point. Thus, women showed 
a greater willingness to vote for one of the other, perhaps less obvious or famous, 
candidates in the field.  Moreover, women were less likely to say they voted for a 
particular player because he won trophies and more likely to say that their vote was based 
on the player being the best in his team or country.  
 Whether such differences reflect gendered ways of consuming soccer and soccer 
celebrity is beyond the scope of this paper. 2018 finally saw the introduction of a separate 
Ballon d’Or election for best female player in the world; only time will tell whether 
women as producers and consumers will incorporate their own meanings into the sport or 
seek to imitate the male narrative (Williams 2013). In the end, given the huge importance 
it has for many people around the globe, soccer is an almost ideal context in which to 
study not just celebrity politics, but questions of popularity, elections, migration, 
inequality, and even civil war to name but a few (e.g., Miguel, Saiegh Satyanath 2011). 
As historian David Goldblatt has noted, “No history of the modern world is complete 
without an account of soccer” (Goldblatt 2008, xviii). We would only slightly paraphrase 
Goldblatt by noting that no politics of modern times is complete without an account of the 
politics of soccer. 
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Appendix A. The Votefoot Survey and Sample 
We constructed a website (votefoot.org) that presented the list of 30 candidates 
nominated by France Football for the 2016 Ballon d’Or award and invited participants to 
vote for the best player of the year. Voting was open to anyone, anywhere, and available 
in English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish. No financial or other 
material incentives were provided to participants. 
 
The data are based on a convenience sample, given that information about the population 
of soccer fans – census-like demographic information – does not exist and traditional 
sampling procedures therefore were not available to us. (See, Coppock, Leeper and 
Mullinix 2018 for a discussion of the use of convenience sampling to address political 
science questions.) However, because we did want to attract soccer fans specifically, by 
virtue of self-selection into the survey, we captured those with a strong interest in the 
sport. We investigated this assumption with the help of a question that asked respondents’ 
interest in soccer. On a 1-10 scale that asked respondents’ interest in soccer, the average 
response was 8.05. 
 
We did not restrict voting by age. Voting age is 18 in most countries (16 in some). We 
assume that it is reasonable that young citizens are well informed about soccer and 
therefore included respondents 16 years of age and older (our results do not change when 
we included only respondents 18 years and above). To prevent respondents from voting 
more than once, we tracked IP addresses and we only allowed one vote per IP address. 
Thus, each respondent’s choice was counted only once. The votes were followed by a 
brief survey to elicit responses to a variety of attitudinal and demographic questions. A 
total of 4,700 participants from 102 different countries participated in the election 
between November and December 2016 – that is, during the time of the Ballon d’Or 
selection. Our multivariate analyses are confined our analyses here to the 3,234 
participants from 90 countries who provided valid responses to all survey questions used. 
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Appendix B. Question Wording 
 
Barcelona and Real Madrid fan. “Which club, or clubs do you support?” (only one 
response) 
- ‘Only one club’ 
- ‘More than one club’ 
- ‘No club in particular’ 
Follow-up question: “Name(s) of clubs you support.”  
Recoded (1) to denote mention of Barcelona/Real Madrid, (0) otherwise. 
Reasons for watching soccer. “When you watch a game, what is more important for you ? 
Some people care more about who wins and loses, while others care more about how the 
game is played. How about you: What’s more important – results or quality of play?” 
(only one response) 
- ‘Watching a well played game’ 
- ‘Seeing your team win the game’ 
- ‘Both are equally important’ 
- ‘I don’t know’ 
Recoded into two variables, where (1) indicates ‘watching a well played game’ or ‘seeing 
your team win the game’, (0) otherwise. 
Reasons for vote choice. “You just voted for the best player in the world. For what reason 
do you consider this player to be the best in the world? (tick all that apply) (several 
responses possible) 
- ‘He has displayed the highest level of skill and talent’ 
- ‘He has helped his team win important games or a trophy’ 
- ‘I like his style of play best’ 
College Education. “What is your level of education?” 
- Primary education (7 years at school or less) 
- Secondary education (up to 11 years at school) 
- Upper education (more than 11 years at school or university) Prefer not to answer 
Recoded into a dummy variable, where (1) indicates ‘upper education’, (0) otherwise. 
Married. “Are you... 
- Single 
- Living with a partner 
- Divorced Widow/widower 
- Prefer not to answer 
Recoded into a dummy variable, where (1) indicates ‘living with a partner’, (0) otherwise. 
Big city. “Do you live in…” 
- A rural area 
- Small city 
- Big city 
- Prefer not to answer 
Recoded into a dummy variable, where (1) indicates ‘big city’, (0) otherwise. 
Religious. “How often do you attend religious services?” 
- Often 
- Sometime 
- Seldom 
- Prefer not to say 
Recoded into a dummy variable, where (1) indicates ‘often’, (0) otherwise. 
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Current player. “Do you play football?” (only one response) 
- Yes in a club 
- Yes but only occasionally 
- Not currently, but I have played organized football in the past (in a team) 
- Not currently, but have played the game in the past (in school or with friends) 
- I’ve never played 
- Prefer not to answer 
Recoded into a dummy variable, where (1) indicates ‘yes in a club, (0) otherwise. 
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Appendix C. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Min Max 
Messi points 1.74 2.09 0 5 
Ronaldo points 1.78 2.07 0 5 
Barcelona Fan 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Real Madrid Fan 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Watch for victory 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Watch for well played game 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Player's skill & talent 0.66 0.46 0 1 
Player has won games & trophies  0.60 0.49 0 1 
Like player's style 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Winning v. style scale 0.43 0.36 0 1 
Female 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Married 0.57 0.49 0 1 
College 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Big city 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Religious services (often) 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Age 32.53 10.78 16 94 
Active player 0.12 0.33 0 1 
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Appendix D. Regression Results 
 
Regression Analysis of Vote for Ronaldo and Messi       
            
Variable Messi   Ronaldo     
            
Club Affinity           
   Real Madrid Fan -0.714 *** 1.464 ***   
  (.142)   (.143)     
   Barcelona Fan 1.460 *** -0.594 ***   
  (.157)   (.158)     
Soccer values           
   See team win 0.083   0.095     
  (.088)   (.088)     
   See well-played game 0.084   -0.137     
  (.074)   (.075)     
   Player: Wins games & trophies -0.286 *** 1.054 ***   
  (.067)   (.068)     
   Player: Style 0.079   -1.011 ***   
  (.065)   (0.66)     
   Player: Skill 1.200 *** -0.060     
  (.070)   (.070)     
Female -0.614 *** -0.598 **   
  (.126)   (.128)     
Married -0.072   0.245     
  (.071)   (.071)     
College 0.281 * 0.032 *   
  (.117)   (.118)     
Big city -0.137   0.176     
  (.069)   (.069)     
Religious 0.137   -0.112 ***   
  (.165)   (.167)     
Age 0.003   -0.015     
  (.003)   (.003)     
Active player 0.266 ** -0.097     
  (.099)   (.100)     
Constant 1.077   1.900     
  (.221   (.185)     
Variance Components            
   Country-level 0.486   0.382     
   Individual-level 1.827   1.843     
    ρ 0.066   0.004     
   R2(overall) 0.15   0.19     
N  3,234     3,234      
            
Source: Votefoot survey           
Notes: Random intercept multilevel GLS regression models; clustered standard errors (in 
parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Vote for Ronaldo or Messi: 5 (1st place), 3 (2nd place), 1 (3rd place), 0 
otherwise. 
*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001.           
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Notes
1 George Best (1946-2005) is widely considered the best Northern Irish soccer player who 
ever lived. The saying became a commonly used bon mot during Best’s heydays.  
2 There is a long-standing debate as to whether the sport should be referred to as 
“football” rather than, or as well as, “soccer” (Friedman 2014). For reasons of familiarity 
for a North American audience, we decided to use the term soccer. 
3 Weah received 19.6% of the votes cast for 34 candidates, beating out Jürgen Klinsmann 
(Bayern Munich; 14.7%) and Jari Litmanen (Ajax Amsterdam, 9.1%). 
4 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_American_professional_sports_figures_who_held_e
lective_office 
5 The list of athletes-turned-politicians includes Ken Dryden (Canada, ice hockey), Seb 
Coe (UK, track and field), Guy Drut (France, track and field), Marat Safin (Russia, 
tennis), Romario (Brazil, soccer), Manny Pacquiao (Philippines, boxing), Vitali Klitschko 
(Ukraine, boxing), Imre Khan (Pakistan, cricket), Kakha Kaladze (Georgia, soccer), and 
many others. 
6 They include long-standing contests like the Oscars, Grammys, and the Eurovision song 
contest or more recent incarnations like American Idol and Big Brother. 
7 According to FIFA, soccer’s global governing body, over 270 million people are 
actively involved as players or referees among its 207 member associations. FIFA Big 
Count 2006. http://www.fifa.com/media/news/y=2007/m=5/news=fifa-big-count-2006-
270-million-people-active-football-529882.html. Similarly, in a survey conducted by 
Nielsen in 2014 across thirty-four countries on different continents, an average of well 
over sixty percent of respondents reported following the sport, with a staggering 83% of 
Nigerians saying they follow soccer, alongside three out of four respondents in countries 
like Indonesia (77%) and Thailand (75%). 
8 Undoubtedly, it was also helpful that AC Milan won Italy’s and Europe’s 
championships during the 1994 election year. 
9 For example, people in countries hosting the Olympic games or experiencing greater 
success in them report higher levels of happiness (Kavetsos and Szymanski 2010; Kuper 
and Szymanski 2018; Dolan et al. 2016). In the American context, winning sporting 
championships makes people happy and positively affects voters’ evaluations of 
government performance (Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010). 
10 Deloitte’s annual authoritative report on the soccer industry calculates that the 
European soccer market alone generated $30 billion in revenues in 2016/2017, an $8 
billion increase relative to 2011/2012 and a compound annual growth rate of seven 
percent (Deloitte 2017). Most of this growth has been driven by the world’s most popular 
and therefore financially most successful leagues: The English Premier League, France’s 
Ligue 1, the German Bundesliga, Italy’s Serie A, and La Liga in Spain. 
11 This assessment and the transfer came before the publication of rape allegations against 
Ronaldo by an American woman in Las Vegas.  
12 To theorize the political power of celebrity, scholars have developed categorizations of 
the different types of celebrity politics and celebrity politicians as advocates, activists, 
celebrity politicians, and politician celebrities (Street 2018; West and Orman 2003; see 
also Marsh el al., 2010). Scholars have classified them according to whether they are 
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primarily politicians or celebrities (Street 2004), or whether they are “everyday celebrity 
politicians” or “superstar celebrity politicians” (Wood et al. 2016). 
13 Originally conceived as a contest to determine the best player of European nationality 
playing in Europe, the competition was expanded in 1995 to include all players regardless 
of nationality. Given that the world’s top leagues are all European leagues, the Ballon 
d’Or became the de facto contest for being recognized as the best player in the world. 
14 There have been several other, smaller changes in rules and the administration of the 
award, most notably the fact that the Ballon d’Or was jointly run by France Football and 
FIFA, the world governing body, between 2010 and 2015. During this period, the final 
winner was determined by the equally weighted percentage of votes among the three 
“constituencies” – journalists, coaches, and players. 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/ballon-dor/playeroftheyear-
men/02/71/10/97/rulesofallocation2015-en_neutral.pdf 
15 http://www.espn.co.uk/football/blog/espn-fc-united-blog/68/post/1840179/decoding-
the-ballon-dor?src=com 
16 This includes a total of 99 players since 1956, several of whom made the top three in 
multiple years, for a total of 188 observations. This list also includes 36 players in the 
modern era (since 1995) for a total of 69 observations. In two years, there was a tie for 2nd  
(1991) and 3rd place (1957). 
17 We use 1995 as a cutoff for comparing two eras. However, this does not bias our 
findings of trends reported here in any meaningful way. 
18 Across all professional leagues in Europe, about 40% of players are “imports”, with 
percentages of foreign-born players as high as 55% (Italy) or even 60% (England). 
Demographic Study of European Football (2009-2017), CIES. http://www.football-
observatory.com/IMG/sites/mr/mr29/en/ 
19 We do not address how broadcasting has potentially transformed constructions of 
ideologies and identities related to masculinity, morality, race, gender, or ethnicity (see, 
for instance, Boyle and Haynes 2000). 
20 The final tally, based on a voting system that asked electors to assign 5, 3, or 1 points 
for the top three ranked candidates, showed Ronaldo winning with 745 points, while 
Messi received 316 points. The only other candidate in the running was Atletico Madrid’s 
Antoine Griezman whose team had faced Real Madrid in the Champions League final (he 
finished third with 198 points). 
21 Between 2010 and 2015, FIFA and the Ballon d’Or decided to manage the election for 
best player jointly. Starting with the 2016 electoral cycle, France Football and FIFA 
ended their partnership and go back to managing the contest on their own, with France 
Football and FIFA running two contests in parallel. The FIFA award is called the “FIFA 
Best Player Award”. While the Ballon d’Or continued with its practice of an electorate 
composed of journalists, the FIFA award organizers decided to hold the election with the 
help of four equally weighted electorates: journalists, national coaches, national team 
captains, and the public via an online poll. 
22 Over the years, this model has been supplemented by an instrumental version that sees 
partisanship as a kind of running tally of party performance, ideological beliefs, and 
proximity to the party in terms of preferred policies. Both versions agree that partisanship 
helps voters navigate the political arena and contains an affective component (Burden and 
Klofstad 2005). 
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23 Most research on soccer supporters has focused on classifying different types of fans 
and understanding problems of hooliganism and working class identity (see, e.g., Clarke 
1978; Frosdick and Marsh 2013). 
24 As a consequence, modern fans’ relationships with “their” club differ on two key 
dimensions: first, whether they have “a longer, more local and popular cultural 
identification with the club” or “a more market-centered relationship to the club as 
reflected in the centrality of consuming club products”; second, by the “degrees to which 
the club is central to the individual’s project of self-formation” (Giulianotti 2002: 31).  
25 Statistics from a similar 2016 survey on French fans suggest that fans are monogamous: 
Three-quarters of fans who responded to the survey said they were a “supporter of only 
one club” and fewer than 15% of “two or more clubs.” Moreover, on a scale from 0 to 10, 
85% of fans rated their attachment to the club to be at least an 8. In addition, the main 
reason (in more than 75% of cases) cited to explain this attachment was that is the club of 
the respondent’s childhood. https://www.lequipe.fr/Football/Actualites/Enquete-sur-le-
supporterisme-mais-si-les-ultras-ont-la-cote/738617 
26 The social identity of partisanship also produces strong pressures for motivated 
reasoning. A significant body of research suggests that partisans hear and see what they 
want to hear and see in ways that are consistent with their partisan predispositions (Lenz 
2012; Leeper and Sloothuus 2014). This literature would strongly suggest that 
respondents like Ronaldo because they follow Real Madrid not that they follow Real 
Madrid because they like Ronaldo. 
27 Holding these values in the abstract doe not have to equate to a stability of position in 
practice. For example, fans who value the aesthetic qualities of performance (style), may 
nevertheless, in specific circumstances (a match against local rivals or stronger 
opponents) come, temporarily, to value winning as more important. As well, the tradition 
of a particular club may have an impact on the values of their fans. Finally, even within 
the same teams, some players may be valued for their competitive nature, while others are 
admired for their aesthetic qualities. 
28 This would be consistent with Zaller’s (1992) receive-accept-sample model of public 
opinion formation. 
29 A recent report by FifPro, the global body representing professional players, on 
working conditions among professional soccer players worldwide supports this view. It 
estimated that around 75% of all professionals earn less than fifty thousand dollars a year. 
In contrast, Forbes estimated that FC Barcelona’s Lionel Messi earned about eighty 
million dollars in 2017 while Real Madrid’s Cristiano Ronaldo was the world’s best paid 
athlete, earning ninety-three million dollars from playing ($58mm) and commercial 
activities ($35mm). 
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Figure 1. Ballon d’Or Winners By League 
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Figure 2. Ballon d’Or Winners By Club 
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Figure 3. Ballon d’Or Winners By Nationality 
 
 
 
3
3
1
1
7
1
4
1
6
5
4
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
5
0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
USSR
Spain
Scotland
Portugal
Netherlands
N Ireland
Italy
Hungary
Germany
France
England
Denmark
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Ukraine
Portugal
Liberia
Italy
Germany
France
England
Czech
Brazil
Argentina
Before 1995 After 1995
Frequency
Winners Before and After 1995
Ballon d'Or Winner Nation of Origin
3
1
3
10
3
4
2
16
2
14
2
23
14
13
4
2
2
1
1
3
7
12
1
3
5
7
1
5
1
1
11
11
0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25
Yugoslavia
Wales
USSR
Spain
Scotland
Portugal
Poland
Netherlands
N Ireland
Italy
Hungary
Germany
France
England
Denmark
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Austria
Yugoslavia
Ukraine
Spain
Portugal
Liberia
Italy
Germany
France
Finland
England
Czech
Croatia
Brazil
Argentina
Before 1995 After 1995
Frequency
Top 3 Ranked Ballon d'Or Vote Finishers
Player Nation of Origin
 45 
 
 
Figure 4. Playing Positions of Ballon d’Or Winners 
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